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Abstract: We estimate a reduced form model of expectations-based reference-dependent 
preferences to explain job retention of older workers in Europe in the context of the 2009 
economic crisis. Using individual micro-economic longitudinal data from SHARE (The Survey of 
Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe) between 2006 and 2011, we derive a measure of 
“good, bad or no surprise” from (i) workers’ anticipated evolution of their standard of living five 
years from 2006 (reference point), and from (ii) a comparison of their capacity to make-ends-meet 
between 2006 and 2011. We find that the probability to remain on the labour market in 2011 is 
significantly higher for individuals who experienced a lower than expected standard of living. The 
effect of a “bad surprise” on job retention is larger than the effect of a “good surprise” once netted 
out from the effects of expectations at baseline, change in consumption utility, and the usual life-
cycle determinants on job retention of older workers. We interpret this result as an evidence of loss 
aversion in the case the reference point is based on individuals’ expectations. We also find that 
loss aversion is more common among men, risk-averse individuals and those with a higher 
perceived life expectancy. 
 
Key words: Job retention, Behavioural economics, Loss aversion, SHARE data 
 
JEL Codes: J26, D03, C23 
 
 
1. LIRAES (EA 4470) & Endowed Chair AGEINOMIX, Univ. Paris Descartes, SPC, Paris. 
2. Univ. Paris-Est Créteil & ERUDITE (EA 437), TEPP (FR CNRS 3435) 
 
  
 2
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The employment rate of older Europeans has been increasing since 2000 as a result of 
structural reforms of the labour market and pension plans of welfare states, and the 2009 
economic crisis did not significantly impact this trend. Retirement decisions in the context of 
the contemporary “great depression” have been widely studied in the US (Coile and Levine, 
2011; Gustman et al., 2010; Goda et al., 2011; Szinovacz et al. 2013) and in Europe (Aranki 
and Macchiarelli, 2013; García-Pérez et al., 2013; Crawford, 2013). These empirical studies 
helped clarify the two-sided theoretical mechanisms at play. On the one hand, economic 
decline and unemployment reduced economic opportunities for job retention and favoured 
moderate increases in retirement, essentially among lower socio-economic groups. On the 
other hand, the decrease in the value of assets due to declining stock and housing markets led 
to modest or non-significant postponement of retirement. By and large, the major economic 
factors (changes in unemployment, stock market, or housing market) have a contradictory and 
modest effect on changes in anticipated retirement age and retirement decisions. Goda et al. 
(2011) suggest that the wealth shocks per se may not have affected shifts in retirement 
decisions, but rather other factors associated with the crisis and that also correlated with stock 
market indexes. The authors specifically pinpoint the potential influence of behavioural 
determinants via economic pessimism. They even assume that the latter could be the “true 
driver of individuals’ perceptions of their retirement security”. 
 
Recent studies in behavioural economics shed light on factors other than the standard 
determinants of retirement provided by the life-cycle framework (see Knoll, 2011 for a review 
of the literature). Drawing on Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979), individual 
choices result from the evaluation of gains and losses relative to a reference point. The models 
typically incorporate loss aversion: in evaluating outcomes, losses are given more weight than 
gains. A loss is regarded as an outcome that the decision maker perceives as negative in 
relation to a reference point. A fundamental issue in reference dependent models is the 
specification of the reference point. In Koszegi and Rabin’s (2006) model of reference-
dependent preferences considered rational expectations as a reference point. They assume that 
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reference point is based on recent outcomes and tied to beliefs about outcomes. A potential, 
though less studied reference point for older workers is the level of income they expect to 
earn in the labour market before they retire. “Equating the reference point with expectations 
[…] is […] important for understanding financial risk: while an unexpected monetary 
windfall in the lab may be assessed as a gain, a salary of $50,000 to an employee who 
expected $60,000 will not be assessed as a large gain relative to status-quo wealth, but rather 
as a loss relative to expectations of wealth.” (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006: 1135). 
 
The 2009 economic crisis provides a unique change of context, which could more than 
usually reveal individual behaviours in the case where their expectations are not met. The 
crisis can be seen as an exogenous shock to most people, which would lead to changes in the 
future that individuals did not foresee as they where forming their expectations about their 
future well-being. Much in line with the target-income literature (Camerer et al. 1997), we 
expect older workers with a loss relative to expectations of wealth to increase their 
willingness to work and to postpone retirement. Koszegi and Rabin’s (2006) model provides 
three reasons why workers would have remained at work: (i) higher labour market earnings 
would help meet the target-income in the following periods, (ii) anticipations of higher 
earnings foster labour force participation, and (iii) loss aversion associated with inaccurate 
adverse forecasts, or a “bad surprise”, would have led workers to compensate this “loss” by 
means of higher earnings in the labour market. The main hypothesis we test here is that in 
case of loss aversion, individuals who experienced a “bad surprise” i.e. a situation where the 
standard of living was lower than expected, were more likely to remain active on the labour 
market, ceteris paribus. 
 
The main contribution of this work is to take into account non-standard preferences in 
individuals’ decision to retire or remain on the labour market at older ages in the context of 
the 2009 economic crisis. Although the determinants of the job retention of older workers in 
Europe are well documented in the economic literature, the empirical literature devoted to 
retirement planning and expectations is less studied (Riedel, 2015). One difficulty that needs 
to overcome is that reference points are not directly observable economic variables. 
Nonetheless, in the case of expectations as reference points, standard survey questions on 
individuals’ expectations can provide satisfactory proxies. 
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Using individual micro-economic longitudinal data from SHARE (The Survey of Health, 
Ageing, and Retirement in Europe) between 2006 and 2011, we derive a measure of a “bad 
surprise” from respondents’ anticipated evolution of their standard of living in the five years 
following 2006, and from a comparison of households’ capacity to make ends meet in 2006 
and 2011. Basically, three situations can arise: (i) “no surprise”, when the individuals’ 
anticipations matched the expected situation; (ii) a “good surprise”, when they experienced a 
better situation than they expected; and (iii) a “bad surprise”, when individuals anticipated an 
increase in wellbeing that did not occur. These variables are associated with the usual life-
cycle determinants of retirement decision to explain older workers’ decision to remain on the 
labour market in 2011. In the presence of loss aversion, the effect of a “bad surprise” on job 
retention should be larger than the opposite effect of a “good surprise,” once the effects of 
misapprehension, change in utility consumption, and other individual characteristics are 
netted out. 
 
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a brief review of the literature of the 
main determinants of job retention and retirement decisions in terms of the life-cycle model 
and behavioural economics studies on expectations. In section 3, we present the dataset used 
and the econometric specifications, with full details on the variables used. The results are 
presented in section 4 and a discussion is provided in section 5. A number of conclusion are 
drawn in the last section. 
 
2. Previous Literature 
 
2.1. Retirement decisions and job retention of older workers in the life cycle 
framework 
 
In the life-cycle approach, wealth, health and work conditions are considered as the main 
drivers of the labour force participation of older workers. Wealth is obviously an important 
driver of the decision and timing of retirement (Dorn and Sousa-Poza 2005; Bütler et al. 
2005). While poorer individuals have less financial capacity to decide between employment 
and retirement before the legal retirement age, wealthier individuals are more prone to 
anticipate their departure from the labour market. This being said, wealthier workers have a 
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lower utility of leisure and may remain in the labour market longer, especially if they entered 
the labour market at older ages because of higher education. By and large, individuals who 
enjoy a higher socio-economic status (SES) tend to work longer than lower SES individuals 
(Li et al., 2008). Individual preferences play a major role in retirement planning. For instance, 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) show that retirement is often a joint decision between 
husband and wife. 
 
Health status appears to be one of the most important determinants of the labour market 
participation of older workers (Barnay, 2015; Lindeboom, 2006). Although the relationship 
between health status and labour supply appears obvious, the direction of causality is 
ambiguous (Strauss and Thomas, 1998). Two effects appear to simultaneously play in 
opposite directions: work conditions can be the source of health deterioration and, at the same 
time, poor health can be the cause of withdrawal from the labour market. Many empirical 
studies have shown a “healthy worker effect.” Poor health status results in early retirement 
from the labour market (Alavinia and Burdorf 2008; Jones et al. 2010). Dwyer and Mitchell 
(1999) show that unhealthy people plan to retire on average 1 to 2 years earlier. Garcia-
Gomez (2011) studies the impact of a health shock on labour-market outcomes in nine 
European countries on the basis of the ECHP. The results, obtained by applying matching 
methods, suggest that health shocks have a significant causal effect on the probability of 
employment: persons suffering from a health shock are much more susceptible to leave their 
job and transiting through disability. 
 
Job satisfaction and work conditions influence the retirement decision to the same extent as 
health status (Väänänen et al., 2004; Ferrie et al., 2005). Karasek and Theorell (1990) and 
Siegrist (1996) developed models revealing the impact of work conditions on health status. 
Using a longitudinal dataset and cross-country comparisons, Llena-Nozal (2009) and Datta 
Gupta and Kristensens (2008) showed that a favourable work environment and high job 
security lead to better health conditions. In addition, job satisfaction is often used as an 
overall summary of feelings about how workers consider their job. This concept is 
particularly important as the feelings of work-related satisfaction or dissatisfaction contribute 
to overall quality of life (Drobnič et al., 2010). Finally, hard working conditions and the 
degradation of health capital contribute to lower productivity among older workers, increasing 
their take-up of sick leave and raising the risk of job loss in Europe. 
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2.2. Expectations and retirement decisions 
 
Aggregate retirement behaviour hides huge differences among individuals. Choi et al. (2014) 
state that some people make better economic decisions than others and the heterogeneity in 
choices is linked to differences in preferences, information and beliefs. A number of studies 
point out the role of expectations on the retirement planning process. Expectations can lead to 
the establishment of reference points, which may affect the decision of when to retire. For 
instance, on the basis of a Dutch panel data on retirement behaviour, van Solinge and 
Henkens (2009) show that workers with a higher perceived life expectancy plan to retire later. 
The economic theory postulates a certain number of mechanisms through which this indicator 
modifies individuals’ behaviour in the face of retirement: a wealth effect at the end of the life 
cycle, an uncertainty effect on savings, and an effect related to the risk of longevity. Hurd and 
McGarry (1995) and Hamermesh (1985) suggest that respondents have a fairly good idea of 
their probability of living to 75 years old. For Hurd, McFadden and Merrill (1999), the 
probability of survival is related to both health status and predicted life expectancy. 
Individuals thus appear to have quite a fairly precise idea of their individual life expectancy 
and adjust their retirement decision by estimating their life expectancy after retirement (Hurd, 
Smith and Zissimopoulos, 2004).  
 
Other expectations can also have an impact on the retirement decision such as anticipating 
future pension reforms. Some studies focus on the adjustment of individuals’ retirement 
expectations following an exogenous chock such as a pension reform. From a German 
longitudinal study, where respondents reported the age at which they expected to retire, 
Coppola and Wilke (2014) estimate the impact of the 2007 German pension reform (increase 
in the SRA from 65 years to 67). Using a difference in differences method, their findings 
conclude that subjective retirement expectations are more sensitive to policy changes for 
younger cohorts and high educational attainment groups. 
 
 
3. Data and methods 
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3.1. Source and sample 
 
SHARE is a multidisciplinary and cross-national cohort of individual data on health, socio-
economic status and social and family relationships of more than 100,000 individuals aged 50 
or over. Countries that took part in 2004 baseline the project are a balanced representation of 
the various regions in Europe, ranging from Northern (Denmark, Sweden, and the 
Netherlands) through Central Europe (Austria, France, Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium), 
and the Mediterranean (Spain, and Italy). Eastern countries (Poland and the Czech Rep.) 
joined the project in 2006. Data are collected on the basis of a two-year follow-up schedule 
and provided prospective panel survey data. The third wave of the project, SHARELIFE, 
conducted in 2008-09, aimed at extending the panel retrospectively. On this one occasion, 
respondents were interviewed about their life history. Different fields such as childhood 
health, education, job career, family life, housing, etc. were surveyed and provided useful 
information on initial conditions and life course. So far, five waves of SHARE have been 
made available to researchers. 
 
In this study, we focus on the three waves of SHARE between 2006 (wave 2) and 2011 (wave 
4) for three reasons: (i) we are interested in the context of the 2009 economic crisis; (ii) wave 
3 provides life-history combined with a unique set of behavioural variables that is not 
replicated in further waves of SHARE; and (iii) the set of countries expanded to Eastern 
regions since wave 2 give SHARE a more comprehensive representation of European 
societies. The initial sample of respondents taking part in the three waves consisted of 17,160 
individuals. Since our interest is the change in older workers’ labour supply between 2006 
and 2011, (i) we keep the 9,452 respondents aged 50 or more at wave 2 and under 70 at wave 
4; and (ii) we discard another 5,069 respondents who are not employed in wave 2. The 
working sample consists of 4,383 employed respondents in 2006 who had either left the 
workforce, or had remained active on the labour market in 2011. Notice that 7.5% of the 
sample are discarded because of missing data in the set of explanatory variables used. The 
final sample is composed of 4,054 observations. 
 
3.2. Variables 
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The variable we aim to explain is individuals’ change in labour supply between 2006 and 
2011. Since all respondents were employed or self-employed in 2006, the explained variable 
could have just indicated whether the respondent retired in 2011. However, the usual 
distinction between retired, unemployed, or inactive is not really appropriate in the case of 
older workers as any kind of exit from the labour force could be analysed as a transitory stage 
before reaching the statutory retirement age. Claiming public benefits from unemployment 
and disability statuses for some time are found to be common pathways to retirement in 
Europe. In order to capture the full dynamics of retirement decisions, the status “retired” was 
combined with other non-working conditions in a mixed-bag of statuses depicting exit from 
the labour force. Our goal is not to disentangle the status “retired” from unemployed or 
inactive statuses. As a consequence, one may say that the variable to be explained is ‘job 
retention’ between 2006 and 2011. We select all employed or self-employed respondents in 
2006 and we estimate the probability of being employed four years later. The dependant 
variable is dichotomous, taking the value 1 if the respondents self-report in 2011 being 
currently employed or self-employed, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Our main variable of interest is derived from two subjective measures of expected and 
experienced changes in living standard between 2006 and 2011. This measure appears in line 
with the definition of person’s reference point from Koszegi and Rabin (2006: 1141) “(...) 
probabilistic beliefs about the relevant consumption outcome held between the time she first 
focused on the decision determining the outcome and shortly before consumption occurs”. 
First, respondents are asked in the base year, what the chances (in per cent) were that five 
years from then their standard of living would be better (“the ability to buy goods and 
services”), and then, what would be the chance they got worse. If the response is higher than 
50%, respondents expected some increase or some decrease in living standard. A third case is 
considered when respondents with a probability lower than 50% in both cases were classified 
as expecting a relative status quo. The very rare cases (1.2% of the working sample) when 
respondents gave contradictory responses (i.e. expecting both increase and decrease in living 
standard) are considered as missing values; other values are coded (–1) for expected decrease 
(0) expected status quo or (1) for expected increase. Second, the change in living standard 
respondents experienced is a simple three-category measure of (–1) decline, (0) status quo, or 
(1) improvement in income adequacy derived from a self-assessed question that was asked in 
the base year (2006) and repeated at the following wave (2011): “Thinking of your 
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household’s total monthly income, would you say that your household is able to make ends 
meet (1) with great difficulty, (2) with some difficulty, (3) Fairly easily, or (4) Easily.” Third, 
the cross-product of the categorical variables of expectations and experience allow us to 
define three additional situations: whether the respondents experienced a “bad surprise” (the 
standard of living of 2011 was lower than expected), a “good surprise” (the standard of living 
of 2011 was higher than expected), and “no surprise” (the standard of living of 2011 was 
more or less expected). Fourth, since our variables of interest were based on changes in living 
standards between waves, we wished to control for other contemporaneous changes in other 
domains, like health and social. We derive a dichotomous measure of health shock taking the 
value 1 if the respondent declared the onset of a chronic disease in the period, and 0 
otherwise; and a dichotomous measure of change in the marital status – whether the situation 
vis-à-vis the relationship changed between the two waves. 
 
The usual determinants of labour supply in a life-cycle model included individuals’ (i) 
demographic, social and household characteristics, (ii) health, (iii) wealth, and (iv) work 
characteristics in the base year. 
- We first selected personal characteristics like age (continuous), gender, education (in 
three levels: lower than high school, high school or college, and university degree), 
and whether the respondent is a migrant (not born in the country of residence). As 
family constraints may prove important determinants of labour supply, we retained a 
set of variables in the base year which depicted whether (i) the spouse is active or 
inactive, (ii) the respondent is a caregiver (help given outside the household), and (iii) 
respondents’ children aged 18 to 24 in the household are in education, unemployed, or 
at home. They respectively account for joint husband and wife retirement decisions, 
informal activities of taking care of an elderly person, and the financial burden of 
having dependent children in the household, that may reduce the incentive to retain a 
job. 
- We also retain a measure of poor self-rated health, which is a variable dichotomising 
the US version of self-perceived health into two categories: (0) excellent and very 
good and (1) less than very good. Since items from the self-rated health scale may 
represent different things for different people, it is possible to anchor the rating on a 
set of health measures that better depicts the multidimensional aspect of health 
(Bound, 1991). A logit model is used to predict poor self-rated health in the base year 
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based on individuals’ response to the following variables: body-mass index, number of 
chronic diseases, limitations in activities people usually do, frailty, and depression. A 
logit model is used to predict poor self-rated health in the base year based on 
individuals’ response to the following variables: body-mass index, number of chronic 
diseases, limitations in activities people usually do, frailty, and depression. The 
predicted outcome is simply the individual probability to report less than good health 
in the base year. We also control for respondents’ cognitive capacities in the base year. 
Measures of education level and cerebral performance are indeed potential 
confounders of behavioural responses since errors and biases in decision-making are 
wired into the brain architecture  (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). More precisely, 
recent developments in the literature suggest that numerical ability (a proxy for 
financial literacy), cognition and education level independently predict retirement 
planning (Altman, 2012; Gerardi, Goette & Meier, 2013). SHARE developed an 
objective measure of cognitive functions that comprised both cognitive abilities 
(memory and verbal fluency performance tests) and numeracy (numerical reasoning 
performance tests). The combined measure, called ‘cognitive performance’ is a 
continuous variable taking its theoretical value between 0 and 1. 
- Wealth is measured as the net amount of households’ financial assets in purchasing 
power parity (PPP). Specifically, the net assets are obtained as the sum of amounts 
from bank accounts; bond, stock and mutual funds; and savings for long-term 
investments; minus the amount of financial liabilities. Elements of respondents’ work 
include a categorical variable indicating whether she declared being employee, a civil 
servant or a self-employed. We also retain a self-reported measure of job satisfaction 
taking the value 1 if the respondent (strongly) agreed with the following proposition: 
“all things considered I am satisfied with my job,” and 0 if she (strongly) disagreed. 
 
Additional covariates include some retrospective data. Two variables are collected from the 
wave 3 (SHARELIFE) in order to control for events in the life history of respondents prior to 
wave 1: whether she experienced (i) periods of financial distress or (ii) health problems over 
her adult life. The former is a dummy indicating if the respondent encountered any periods of 
financial hardship throughout her life. The latter is a binary index of health, taking the value 1 
if the respondent reports any periods of ill health over the lifecycle (>1 year) or if she reports 
any physical injury over the lifecycle (>1 year). Two additional behavioural measures are also 
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retained: whether the respondent was risk-averse, i.e. whether she reported taking average or 
no financial risk with regard to savings or investments (1) or taking above than average or 
substantial risks (0); and whether she expects to live a longer life, coded 1 if she reported a 
perceived probability to reach a target age higher than 50%, and 0 if she reported 50% or 
lower. 
 
3.3. Econometric Options 
 
Our aim is to estimate the job retention between 2006 and 2011. Sample selection issues do 
not seem relevant here since our main interest lies in the effect of a specific set of behavioural 
determinants on job retention, rather than job employment. Put differently, our analysis 
focuses on a specific time span (the 2009 economic crisis), so that the determinants of labour 
market exit before 2006 could be thought as independent from those at stake here. We are 
confident in using a simple regression framework, as long as the various sources of individual 
heterogeneity could be addressed, for which SHARE provides a wide set of covariates. Probit 
models are used in the case of dichotomous outcomes to obtain efficient variance estimation. 
A reduced-form model is formally written as:  
 
P(y
 = 1
X
, X
, X
, X
, y
 = 1 = Φ(X
β + X
β + X
β + X
β [1] 
 
where yi is the status on the labour market, Φ the cumulative density function of the normal 
distribution, Xi the explanatory variables, and β the parameters to be estimated. Four sets of 
determinants are considered in turn: X1 represent individual characteristics in the base year 
inspired from the life cycle framework: they include socio-demographic, health, wealth and 
work variables; X2 stand for the retrospective life-history variables which complemented the 
life-cycle model; X3 is the vector of the main behavioural measures of “good and bad 
surprise.” As these variables are derived from a cross-product between two other variables, 
we also include the expected and experienced changes in standards of living, and potential 
confounders for change in health and social relationships over the period. Finally, X4 includes 
additional behavioural measures of risk-aversion and perceived life-expectancy. 
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All four sets of variables are included one after the other (stepwise) and a Likelihood ratio 
(LR) test is performed to evaluate the contribution of the new set of variables to the previous 
model. In order to gain confidence in the results and to explore the effect of our behavioural 
measures, we also estimate the model separately for men and women, and for more traditional 
behavioural measures of risk-aversion and perceived values of life-expectancy. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Standard variables drawn from the life-cycle framework provide a comprehensive overview 
of the sample. Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics. First, the population is 56 years old 
on average, and the share of men (51.4%) and women (48.6%) is well balanced. The job 
retention rate is high: 62.3 % of the active population in employment in wave 2 is still at work 
five years later. Most respondents in the base year are employees (71.2%), and the rest are 
either self-employed (15.4%) or civil servants (13.4%). They are not particularly satisfied 
with their job in the base year (only 45.8%). Second, family constraints are quite important 
for the so-called ‘sandwich generation’ since 40.8% of the sample declare taking care of an 
elderly person outside the household, and 31.7% of the respondents have a child in the 
household who is either in education, unemployed or at home. Third, as expected, 
respondents at work exhibit a “healthy worker effect” as they report quite a good health status 
in the base year (only 15.3% reported poor Self-rated health); and they perform relatively well 
at the cognitive tests (average score of 0.45 for a maximum at 0.88). Nevertheless, a 
significant share of respondents reports the onset of chronic illnesses over the period (23.3%), 
or reported having had health problems during their adult life (19.8%). Fourth, respondents’ 
social and economic status (SES) is rather high with regard to educational levels (37.3% held 
a university degree); and only a minority were migrants (6.1%). Most of the respondents are 
in a relationship in the base year (82.9%) and only modest changes in marital status occur 
over the period (5.9%). About half the spouses (51.8%) are currently working in the base 
year. Households hold an average amount of €81.000 in financial assets (in PPP), but the 
individual situations seem quite diverse (standard deviation of +/– €181.700) and some 
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households exhibit large amounts of debts. About a third of the sample report financial 
difficulties over their life (35.3%). 
 
– Tables 1, 2, 3, & Figure 1 about here – 
Figure 1: Cross-country Effect of Loss Aversion on Labour Supply 
 
Behavioural measures provide complementary information on the sample. On the one hand, 
statistics describing risk-averse respondents (68.7%) or those who forecasted a long life 
expectancy (58.6%) are difficult to interpret since a significant number of observations were 
missing (Table 1). Feedback from the fieldwork suggests that some individuals have 
difficulties envisaging the context of the question on risk-aversion, as not everyone had the 
financial capacity to invest or save money. Other people simply refuse to predict their own 
date of death. On the other hand, our measures based on expectations produce some 
interesting first results. Tables 1 and 2 indicate that most respondents are able to make 
consistent forecasts of the evolution of their living standard (89.4% had “no surprise”). 
Despite the fact that respondents are essentially pessimistic about their future economic 
situation (the average expected change in standard of living is negative: –0.044), the majority 
of them benefited from an improvement of their situation (the average experienced change in 
standard of living is positive: +0.090). These results are consistent with the fact that 
individuals who experienced a “good surprise” were almost twice as many (6.7%) as those 
who experienced a “bad surprise” (3.8%). However, results in Table 3 (and Figure 1) 
indicates that the pairwise effect of a “bad surprise” on job retention was significantly higher 
than the pairwise effect of “no surprise” (respective retention rate of 75.5% vs. 62.3%; p-
value<1%), while the effect of a “good surprise” seemed lower and less significant with 
regard to the same reference (respective retention rate of 56% vs. 62.2%; p-value<5%). We 
interpret this initial result as loss aversion, since individuals who did not meet their reference 
point, remain at work in order to compensate for this loss by obtaining average higher 
incomes than they would outside the labour market. Those with a “good surprise” tend to 
leave the workforce sooner, but to a lesser degree, suggesting that individuals attached more 
to a loss than a gain. Table 3 decomposes the previous result by countries and euro-regions. 
Unfortunately, the more we go in the detail, the less accurate the estimates became because of 
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a lack in statistical power. Nevertheless, the proportions of job retention follow the same 
pattern across “good and bad surprises.” 
 
4.2. Overall model fit 
 
Table 4 presents estimates for four sets of variables included one after the other in the models. 
Estimations for the standard life-cycle model (1) are satisfactory since the estimates have the 
expected signs and the summary statistics appear adequate: McFadden’s pseudo R-squared is 
greater than 25% and 77.3% of the cases were correctly classified. These are similar for the 
three other specifications. The LR tests for models (2) and (3) suggest that successive 
inclusion of retrospective life-history data (chi2=22.26, p-val.<1%) and expectation-based 
behavioural variables (chi2=50.18, p-val.<1%) significantly improved the regression fit. 
However, other behavioural variables such as risk aversion and perceived life expectancy do 
not seem to be important factors (chi2=0.13, p-val.=0.937). The addition of these different 
variables does not significantly modify estimates from previous models, suggesting that our 
model is quite stable. 
 
Turning to the details, model (1) corroborates standard findings from life-cycle theory. First, 
older workers are less prone to remain in the working force (–8 pp. per year old), and women 
tend to be less present on the labour market at wave 4 (–5 pp.). Notice that respondents whose 
spouse is not working in the base year have a higher propensity to leave the labour market (–
9.6 pp.) which suggests that decisions to withdraw from the labour market decisions are not 
taken independently. Second, as expected, health status is associated with job retention 
decisions: in the case of poor self-rated health (–17.8 pp. per 1/100) and cognitive 
performance (+15.6 pp. per 1/10). Third, individuals with a higher level of SES tended to 
work longer than individuals with a lower SES. For instance, possessing a university degree 
(+8.5 pp.), and higher amounts of net financial assets (+1.3 pp. per €10.000) are significant 
drivers of job retention in wave 4. Fourth, respondents who reported being satisfied with their 
job in wave 2 a higher probability to remain in the working force (+4.9 pp.). Fifth, there are 
other individual idiosyncrasies associated with job retention at wave 4: being a migrant (+12.7 
pp.), and being self-employed (+17.5 pp.) in the base year. 
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– Table 4 about here – 
 
Model (2) extends and improves the previous model by adding some retrospective life-history 
variables. Periods of ill health or physical injury over the lifecycle (that lasted for more than a 
1 year) depict the influence of the “long arm” of health conditions on working decisions in 
later life. Respondents having had previous health issues are less prone to remain in the work 
force (–9.6 pp.), even after controlling for the current health status in the base year. Periods of 
financial hardship throughout life appear to play a less important role (+3.5 pp.), maybe 
because of potential trade-offs with the amount of financial assets the individual accumulated 
in later stages of her life. 
 
The effects of additional control variables in Model (3) are in line with these aforementioned 
results. First, inclusion of economic variables corroborates findings from the SES. Individuals 
who expected a higher gain remained in the labour market (+2.8 pp.) suggesting that financial 
opportunities are larger in the labour market than outside of the workplace. Individuals, who 
experience a gain in living standards in 2011, are also more likely to remain in the labour 
market (+6.4 pp.). Second, changes in health and in social characteristics over the period are 
added in order to net out the effect other sources of changes between 2006 and 2011 to 
identify the sole effect of expectation-based behavioural and economic changes. The onset of 
a chronic disease is negatively associated with job retention (–4.1 pp.) giving substance to the 
“health” effect on labour supply. The modification of joint preferences in the couple (change 
in marital status) seems to play a role in job retention decisions (+6.9 pp.). 
 
4.3. Main findings 
 
Models (3) in Table 4 add expectation-based behavioural variables in the extended life-cycle 
framework. From a behavioural perspective, the expected standard of living in 2011 is the 
“reference point,” the change in living standard currently experienced was the “change in 
consumption utility,” and the potential effect of a “bad surprise” on retirement could be 
interpreted a measure of “loss aversion” since it depicts a situation where individuals face a 
loss since they do not reach the reference point. In order for the effect of “bad surprise” to 
provide proper evidence of loss aversion, it should be bigger than the opposite effect of a 
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“good surprise” on labour force participation. Estimates in model (3) for “bad surprise” 
display the expected sign and is significant (+9.9 pp.; p-val.<5%), while estimates for “good 
surprise” have the expected sign were statistically insignificant (–2.2, p-val.>10%). More 
precisely, results from conditional marginal effects comparison tests suggest rejecting the null 
hypothesis (equality of the effects of “bad surprise” and “good surprise” in absolute terms) 
with a p-val.<10%. This suggests a lack of statistical power. However, the value of the 
marginal effects and the difference in significance between “bad surprise” and “good 
surprise” are sufficient to conclude that a “bad surprise” has large effects. We interpret this 
result as evidence of loss aversion. 
 
The estimates for “good or bad surprise” are not significant in model (4), but this model 
appears to be miss-specified after other behavioural measures are included. Risk-aversion and 
perceived life-expectancy are not significant, and the drop in the significance “bad surprise” 
suggests that this could be (i) due to a loss in statistical power due to a large number of 
missing values for these variables, and (ii) the result of a potential trade-off with our 
expectation-based behavioural measures. In order to explore further this issue, model (3) was 
repeatedly estimated on sub-samples of the population, broken by risk-aversion and perceived 
life-expectancy; gender is also considered in an exploratory way as men and women exhibit 
different behaviours with regard to moving or staying on the labour market. 
 
– Table 5 about here – 
 
Table 5 presents estimates of a decomposition of model (3) by several variables. The results 
indicate that individuals with a “bad surprise” are likely to remain at work if they are male 
(+18.7 pp.), risk-averse in the base year (+15.1 pp.), and if they expect to live a longer life 
(+13.2 pp.). The fact that the effect of a “bad surprise” is always significant and large, while 
the effect of a “good surprise” is never significant and always small, support the “loss 
aversion” assumption. The interpretation could be that workers have chosen to remain at work 
in 2011 to compensate for the “loss” they felt with regard to their reference point. The 
estimates for “bad or good surprise” for females, risk-seekers, and those who expect a shorter 
life never were significant. Intuitively, one may interpret these results in the following way (i) 
men are often the main bread earners among the baby-boomer generations, so they may be 
more sensitive to a loss in economic well-being; (ii) risk-averse individuals could also be 
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more sensitive to a loss; (iii) individuals with higher perceived life-expectancy could 
compensate for the loss more easily since they had more time to spend in the labour market. 
In all cases, these result support the behavioural assumption that individuals facing loss 
aversion tend compensate the “loss” (with regard to a reference point) by prolonging work 
activity before retirement. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
5.1. Limitations 
 
We acknowledge this work has some limitations that could provide directions for further 
research. First and foremost, we fail to endogenise the reference point as suggested in Koszegi 
and Rabin (2006). The criticism is that the reference point is a free parameter to be 
determined by the researcher (e.g. Pesendorfer 2006). Nonetheless, we tried to consider the 
expected change in living standard as a predicted outcome of lagged measures of ability to 
make-ends-meet in wave 1 (2004). The increase in the longitudinal dimension reduced the 
statistical power of the sample and the estimated models yielded non-significant results. 
 
We also fail to endogenise the effect of the experienced gain or loss on exits from the labour 
market, leaving us with a potential reverse causality issue. Respondents who remain in the 
work force tend to earn higher average incomes, while those who earn more, are less prone to 
exit from the labour market. Tackling this issue proved quite hard since the use of 
instrumental variables may be complex (i) with the econometric set up to carry out as our 
behavioural variables were derived from the cross-product of two variables, and (ii) with 
regard to the choice of the instruments. However, if we discard the issue of the reference point 
discussed above, the expected gain or loss in living standard was mainly considered as a 
control variable for a “good and bad surprise.” 
 
Although the initial aim was to carry out cross-country comparisons in loss aversion and 
retirement decisions, the small proportion of “bad surprises” combined with the a relatively 
small sample size made thus difficult, if not meaningless, to explore cross-country 
differences. More generally, survey data in behavioural economics are a scarce resource, 
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usually not initially designed to carry out this kind of analysis, so that data limitations are a 
general limitation to overcome. A closer link between research needs and survey data 
production would be beneficial, as the success of the SHARE project demonstrates. 
 
5.2. Avenues for further research 
 
Our results are based on the assumption that respondents’ reference points were stable over 
time, and that the assessment of their economic well-being was consistent over the period. We 
have no evidence supporting this assumption. In theory, an individual’s assessment of her 
situation could be time-inconsistent. For example, although the standard of living did 
decrease, adaptive behaviours (Cros, 2008) could have made the respondent under-estimate 
the loss in economic well-being as she gradually got used to her new living standard. Recent 
developments in economic theory suggest that preferences may change with circumstances 
when properties of the agent’s alternative choices are modified (Dietrich & List, 2013). The 
experimental literature finds that changes in individual preferences may have occurred during 
the great recession (Fisman, Jakiela & Kariv, 2015). 
 
This alternative assumption has theoretical and practical implications. From a theoretical 
perspective, this would have provided a similar result as a shift in the reference point (e.g. 
Arkes et al., 2008; Schwartz et al., 2008; Masiero and Hensher, 2011) and goes back to the 
issue on how to endogenise the reference point in empirical studies. From a practical 
perspective, it suggests that there is a potential over or under-estimation of the “good or bad 
surprise.” For instance, workers would have taken into account the average reduction in 
labour incomes due to the crisis, so that a change in agents’ expectations could have meant 
that agents modified the reference point to a lower level. As a consequence fewer cases of 
‘bad surprise’ would have occurred than what was accounted for, so the effect of the variable 
‘bad surprise’ on job retention would have been reduced. Despite this potential downward 
bias, our results still support the main assumption that a ‘bad surprise’ has a strong and 
persistent effect on job retention. The use of objective measures such as change in income 
amounts could reduce the reporting bias, but would leave us uninformed about how the 
individual rated her on living standard, i.e. whether she feels she reached the reference point 
or not. Since there is to our knowledge no evidence on this issue, we believe further research 
could use longitudinal anchoring vignettes from SHARE to explore the issue of time-
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consistency in the assessment of the living standards between individuals and over time, 
netted out from respondents’ differential item functioning (Bonsang and van Soest, 2012; 
Angelini et al., 2011). 
 
As already mentioned, our expectation-based measures of preferences only identify a small 
proportion of the population outside the range of rational expectations, since only about 10% 
of the sample experienced a “good or bad surprise.” Robustness checks based on a broader 
definition of “good or bad surprise.” (e.g. expecting the status quo and experiencing a loss) do 
not yield significant results, which suggests that the “loss” with regard to the reference point 
must be somehow substantial. In this case, one may assume that individuals with higher 
cognitive capacities tend to make more accurate anticipations. From a theoretical perspective, 
Tversky and Kahneman (1991) assume that reference dependence with loss aversion is a form 
of non-standard preferences linked to cognitive ability. Behaghel and Blau (2012) showed 
that US older workers with higher cognitive ability adapted better to a change in statutory 
retirement age. Nevertheless, in our case, loss aversion remains significant after we control 
for an objective measure of respondents’ cognitive ability. This result gives substance to the 
alternative assumption of affective forecasts (Wilson and Gilbert, 2003) which suggests that 
prediction errors could happen when mental simulations are decontextualized, i.e. the 
contextual factors that are present at the time an individual mentally simulates a future event 
may not be present at the time the event actually occurs. This could typically be in the case of 
some exogenous shock just like the 2009 economic crisis. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We estimate a reduced form model of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences to 
explain job retention of older workers in Europe in the context of the 2009 economic crisis. 
We assume that an individual’s expectation of her living standard in the near future was her 
reference point. Individuals who face a “bad surprise” i.e. they experienced a lower than 
expected level of economic well-being would feel it as a “loss” with regard to their reference 
point. Using SHARE micro-economic individual panel data in Europe between 2006 and 
2011, we find that on average, individuals compensate their “loss” by remaining active longer 
in the labour market – where earnings and economic opportunities are higher. This effect was 
larger than the opposite effect of leaving the workforce in the case of a “good surprise” 
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suggesting that individuals attach more weight to losses than gains. We interpret this result as 
evidence of loss aversion when the reference point is based on expectations. We also find that 
loss aversion is more common among men, risk-averse individuals and those with a higher 
perceived life expectancy. 
 
Our results can partly explain the modest reduction of labour force participation in the context 
of the 2009 crisis that the usual life-cycle determinants of retirement decisions could not 
realistically explain. However, the contribution to our understanding of the complex 
phenomena of retirement is small from a behavioural economics perspective. The relatively 
small proportion of individuals who report suffering a loss with regard to the reference point 
(“bad surprise”) probably does not plead in favour of public or private strategies to help 
people make more accurate predictions. The paradox being that from a public policy 
perspective, the current trend in Europe is to encourage older people to work longer. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Sample Characteristics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
            
Changes between waves 2 and 4           
Labour market           
Still at work (Dep. Var.) 4054 0.623 0.485 0 1 
Living standards           
Bad surprise 4054 0.038 0.192 0 1 
No surprise (ref.) 4054 0.894 0.307 0 1 
Good surprise 4054 0.067 0.251 0 1 
Prob. Gain(+) or Loss(-) in the future (Expected) 4054 -0.044 0.678 -1 1 
Experienced Gain(+) or Loss(-) at wave 4  4054 0.090 0.823 -3 3 
Health and social           
Onset of chronic disease 4054 0.233 0.423 0 1 
Marital status changed 4054 0.059 0.236 0 1 
            
Socio-demog. characteristics (at baseline)           
Age 4054 56 3.7 50 65.9 
Gender (Female) 4054 0.486 0.5 0 1 
Education           
Lower than High School 4054 0.263 0.441 0 1 
High School or College 4054 0.363 0.481 0 1 
University 4054 0.373 0.484 0 1 
Migrant (Not born in the country of residence) 4054 0.061 0.240 0 1 
Caregiver (to give help outside the hhd) 4054 0.408 0.491 0 1 
Spouse's work status           
No spouse 4054 0.171 0.377 0 1 
Spouse works 4054 0.430 0.495 0 1 
Spouse does not work 4054 0.237 0.425 0 1 
Status unknown 4054 0.163 0.369 0 1 
Child burden (18-24 & educ, unemployed, or at home) 4054 0.317 0.465 0 1 
            
Health, Work and Wealth (at baseline)           
Poor Self-Rated Health 4054 0.153 0.189 0.019 0.995 
Cognitive performance 4054 0.452 0.111 0 0.883 
Type of employment           
Employee 4054 0.712 0.453 0 1 
Civil servant 4054 0.134 0.341 0 1 
Self-employed 4054 0.154 0.361 0 1 
Satisfied with job 4054 0.458 0.498 0 1 
Household Net Assets / 1m€ (PPP) 4054 0.810 1.817 -30.7 38.8 
            
Life-course events (wave 3: SHARELIFE)           
Financial difficulties in adult life 4054 0.353 0.478 0 1 
Health issues in adult life 4054 0.198 0.399 0 1 
            
Behavioural measures (at baseline)           
Expects long life 3902 0.687 0.464 0 1 
Risk-averse 2837 0.586 0.493 0 1 
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Table 2: Change in living standards between waves 2 and 4 
  Expected Total 
  Worsen Stable Improve 
Experienced         
Worsen 4.86 10.61 3.82 19.29  
Stable 13.67 28.64 11.05 53.35  
Improve 6.73 14.60 6.02 27.36  
          
Total 25.26 53.85 20.89 100 
 
 
 
Table 3: Sample Main Caracteristics by Country And Euro-region 
Country  N. Indiv. 
Proportion of indiv. still at work at wave 4 
All Good surprise(a) No surprise Bad surprise(a) 
            
North 1401 0.666 0.538** 0.669 0.733 
Denmark 621 0.705 0.444* 0.706 0.792 
Netherlands 402 0.652 0.560 0.652 0.833 
Sweden 378 0.616 0.556 0.624 0.444 
            
Continental 1653 0.618 0.620 0.613 0.761** 
Austria 71 0.423 0.286 0.435 0.500 
Belgium 448 0.549 0.444 0.547 0.684 
France 410 0.605 0.689 0.588 0.714 
Germany 351 0.630 0.579 0.630 0.800 
Switzerland 373 0.740 0.846 0.730 1.000* 
            
Eastern 524 0.492 0.460 0.486 0.737** 
Czechia 297 0.498 0.511 0.490 0.800 
Poland 227 0.485 0.333 0.482 0.714* 
            
Southern 296 0.662 0.524 0.656 0.778 
Italy 296 0.659 0.615 0.646 0.793 
Spain 180 0.667 0.375* 0.673 0.750 
            
Total 4054 0.623   0.560** 0.622 0.755*** 
Note: (a) Two-sample equality-of-propotion test, refernce is "No surprise".  Legend: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table 4: Probit Estimates of the determinants of staying at work – Stepwise  
Dep. Var is "Still at work at wave 4" (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Changes between waves 2 and 4         
Living standards         
Bad surprise     0.099** 0.081    
      (0.049) (0.058)    
Good surprise     -0.022 -0.013    
      (0.040) (0.047)    
No surprise (ref.)     Ref. Ref. 
          
Expected Gain at wave 2     0.028* 0.032*   
      (0.016) (0.018)    
Experienced Gain at wave 4      0.064*** 0.063*** 
      (0.012) (0.014)    
Health and social         
Onset of chronic disease     -0.041** -0.042*   
      (0.020) (0.024)    
Marital status changed     0.069** 0.079**  
      (0.033) (0.037)    
Socio-demog. characteristics (at baseline)         
Age -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.074*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
Gender (Female) -0.050*** -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.031    
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021)    
Education         
Lower than High School Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
High School or College -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.010    
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028)    
University 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.083*** 0.104*** 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027)    
Migrant (Not born in the country of residence) 0.127*** 0.125*** 0.127*** 0.119*** 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.036)    
          
Caregiver (to give help outside the hhd) 0.000 0.001 -0.003 -0.013    
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021)    
Spouse's work status         
No spouse Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Spouse works -0.027 -0.021 -0.025 -0.032    
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028)    
Spouse does not work -0.096*** -0.091*** -0.093*** -0.067**  
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.033)    
Status unknown 0.000 0.003 -0.001 -0.006    
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030)    
 
        
Child burden (18-24 & educ, unemployed,or at home) 0.044** 0.041** 0.037* 0.039*   
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022)    
Health, Work and Wealth (at baseline)         
Poor Self-Rated Health -0.178*** -0.132*** -0.122** -0.141**  
  (0.046) (0.047) (0.048) (0.057)    
Cognitive performance 0.156* 0.152* 0.171** 0.111    
  (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.101)    
Type of employment         
Employee Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Civil servant -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.004    
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031)    
Self-employed 0.175*** 0.174*** 0.173*** 0.157*** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024)    
Satisfied with job 0.049*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.077*** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021)    
Household Net Assets / 1m€ (PPP) 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013**  
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  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)    
Life-course events (wave 3: SHARELIFE)         
Financial difficulties in adult life   0.035** 0.031* 0.021    
    (0.018) (0.018) (0.021)    
Health issues in adult life   -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.092*** 
    (0.023) (0.023) (0.028)    
          
Life-course events (wave 3: SHARELIFE)         
Financial difficulties in adult life       0.007    
 
      (0.023)    
Health issues in adult life       -0.004    
        (0.021)    
          
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N. Obs. 4054 4054 4054 2746 
Pseudo R2 (McFadden) 0.257 0.261 0.270 0.261    
Correctly classified 0.773 0.771 0.779 0.773    
LR test (Chi2) 1379.43 22.26 50.18 0.130    
LR test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.937    
Note: Marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses. LR test: (a) Model 1 vs. constant only model; (b) Model 4 vs. 
3 with the same N. Obs. Legend: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 5: Probit Estimates of the determinants of staying at work – Decomposition by gender and behavioural variables 
Dep. Var is "Still at work at wave 4" All 
Gender Risk-averse Expects long life 
Male Female No Yes No Yes 
                
Changes between waves 2 and 4               
Living standards               
Bad surprise 0.099** 0.187**
* 
-0.018 0.021 0.151** -0.076 0.132**  
  (0.049) (0.055) (0.083) (0.093) (0.066) (0.121) (0.051)    
Good surprise -0.022 -0.021 -0.017 -0.051 -0.031 -0.010 -0.021    
  (0.040) (0.055) (0.058) (0.075) (0.061) (0.068) (0.053)    
No surprise (ref.) Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
                
Expected Gain at wave 2 0.028* 0.039* 0.020 0.053* 0.008 0.044 0.021    
  (0.016) (0.022) (0.023) (0.027) (0.024) (0.033) (0.018)    
Experienced Gain at wave 4  0.064**
* 
0.081**
* 
0.047**
* 
0.075**
* 
0.063**
* 
0.061**
* 
0.062**
* 
  (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.018) (0.021) (0.015)    
Health and social               
Onset of chronic disease -0.041** 
-
0.085**
* 
-0.002 -0.079** -0.019 -0.057 -0.035    
  (0.020) (0.029) (0.029) (0.036) (0.032) (0.036) (0.026)    
Marital status changed 0.069** 0.124**
* 
0.037 0.098* 0.058 0.017 0.112**
* 
  (0.033) (0.046) (0.046) (0.053) (0.049) (0.062) (0.039)    
Socio-demog. characteristics (at baseline)               
Age 
-
0.079**
* 
-
0.082**
* 
-
0.079**
* 
-
0.076**
* 
-
0.075**
* 
-
0.081**
* 
-
0.077**
* 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)    
Gender (Female) 
-
0.053**
* 
    -0.029 -0.044 -0.016 
-
0.070**
* 
  (0.018)     (0.033) (0.027) (0.033) (0.021)    
Education               
Lower than High School Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
High School or College -0.004 -0.050 0.026 0.006 -0.017 -0.034 0.006    
  (0.023) (0.033) (0.032) (0.047) (0.034) (0.041) (0.028)    
University 0.083**
* 
0.059* 0.089**
* 
0.088** 0.121**
* 
0.026 0.103**
* 
  (0.023) (0.033) (0.033) (0.044) (0.035) (0.045) (0.028)    
Migrant (Not born in the country of residence) 0.127**
* 
0.113** 0.147**
* 
0.134**
* 
0.099** 0.115* 0.131**
* 
  (0.031) (0.048) (0.038) (0.046) (0.048) (0.059) (0.036)    
                
Caregiver (to give help outside the hhd) -0.003 -0.016 0.004 0.006 -0.041 -0.029 0.011    
  (0.017) (0.025) (0.025) (0.030) (0.028) (0.034) (0.021)    
Spouse's work status               
No spouse Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Spouse works -0.025 -0.008 -0.031 0.010 -0.062* -0.016 -0.037    
  (0.025) (0.039) (0.033) (0.041) (0.036) (0.045) (0.031)    
Spouse does not work 
-
0.093**
* 
-0.065 
-
0.112**
* 
-0.048 -0.067 -0.024 
-
0.118**
* 
  (0.028) (0.043) (0.038) (0.049) (0.042) (0.049) (0.036)    
Status unknown -0.001 0.014 0.004 0.100** -0.077* 0.046 -0.033    
  (0.031) (0.047) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.054) (0.038)    
 
              
Child burden (18-24 & educ, unemployed,or at 
home) 0.037* 0.020 0.060** 0.043 0.034 0.089** 0.012    
  (0.019) (0.026) (0.028) (0.034) (0.029) (0.036) (0.023)    
 Continued on next page 
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Table 5 continued… 
 
Health, Work and Wealth (at baseline)               
Poor Self-Rated Health -0.122** -0.122 
-
0.134** -0.151* -0.113 -0.101 
-
0.174**
* 
  (0.048) (0.076) (0.062) (0.084) (0.073) (0.075) (0.067)   
Cognitive performance 0.171** 0.226* 0.140 -0.223 0.324** 0.416**
* 
0.087    
  (0.084) (0.121) (0.119) (0.153) (0.131) (0.149) (0.106)   
Type of employment               
Employee Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Civil servant -0.012 -0.029 0.004 0.068 -0.046 -0.020 -0.013    
  (0.026) (0.038) (0.038) (0.043) (0.042) (0.054) (0.031)   
Self-employed 0.173**
* 
0.221**
* 
0.111**
* 
0.123**
* 
0.192**
* 
0.166**
* 
0.183**
* 
  (0.021) (0.026) (0.035) (0.036) (0.031) (0.043) (0.024)   
Satisfied with job 0.049**
* 
0.095**
* 
0.006 0.103**
* 
0.059** 0.074** 0.040*   
  (0.018) (0.025) (0.025) (0.031) (0.027) (0.034) (0.021)   
Household Net Assets / 1m€ (PPP) 0.014**
* 
0.017**
* 
0.006 0.016**
* 
0.016 0.016 0.013**  
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.005)   
Life-course events (wave 3: SHARELIFE)               
Financial difficulties in adult life 0.031* 0.017 0.032 0.028 0.011 0.052 0.022    
  (0.018) (0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.028) (0.034) (0.022)   
Health issues in adult life 
-
0.096**
* 
-
0.083**
* 
-
0.111**
* 
-0.066* 
-
0.117**
* 
-
0.086** 
-
0.098**
* 
  (0.023) (0.032) (0.033) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039) (0.029)   
Country dummies               
N. Obs. 4054 2085 1969 1174 1663 1220 2682 
Pseudo R2 (McFadden) 0.270 0.297 0.266 0.302 0.257 0.258 0.281    
Correctly classified 0.779 0.786 0.785 0.797 0.766 0.766 0.782    
Note: Marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses.Legend: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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